Ryanair will close its Thessaloniki base in the Winter 2026 schedule, withdraw three based aircraft from the airport and significantly reduce its capacity in Greece. According to the airline, the cuts amount to 700,000 seats, or a 45 percent reduction compared with Winter 2025, with 12 routes to be discontinued. Among them is the Thessaloniki-Zagreb route, making the decision relevant for the Croatian market as well. Ryanair is also announcing capacity reductions in Athens and the suspension of winter operations at Chania and Heraklion.
The Irish low-cost carrier attributes the decision to high airport charges and claims that airports operated by Fraport Greece, as well as Athens Airport, have failed to pass on to passengers and airlines the reduction of Greece’s Airport Development Fee, or ADF. According to Ryanair, the Greek government reduced the fee from 12 to 3 euros per passenger from November 2024, but the airline claims this move did not result in lower costs for carriers. Ryanair further states that Fraport Greece’s charges are now 66 percent higher than before the pandemic.
In its public statement, Ryanair used particularly strong language. It described Fraport Greece as a monopoly, accused it of retaining the benefit of the fee reduction, and called on the Greek government to “break up” that monopoly. Such rhetoric is not new for Ryanair. The airline has long used very direct, often aggressive public communication when seeking to put pressure on airports, regulators or governments. From a business perspective, the message is clear: where costs rise, aircraft are moved to markets offering more favorable conditions. However, the question remains how much such public naming and shaming helps long-term relationships with partners, especially when local communities, passengers and the tourism sector find themselves caught between the interests of the airline and airport operators.
Fraport Greece rejects Ryanair’s claims and says that linking the base closure to airport charges or the ADF has no factual basis. According to the operator of the Greek regional airports, this is primarily a business and profitability decision made by the airline itself. This once again raises the question of where legitimate cost negotiations end and where public pressure on partners and the state begins.
In any case, the decision clearly shows how sensitive the low-cost model is to costs. For such airlines, every airport fee, every tax, every route and every aircraft allocation carries direct weight. At the same time, the closure of a base does not necessarily mean that it was loss-making. In Ryanair’s case, with a model highly focused on profitability and cost discipline, most routes and bases generally have to deliver a positive financial result. This is primarily a matter of comparing less and more profitable opportunities within the network. If a base becomes relatively less attractive, capacity can be moved very quickly elsewhere, to a market where the same aircraft can generate a better return during the winter. That flexibility is one of the main strengths of the low-cost model, but also the reason why regions that rely heavily on such carriers can lose a significant part of their connectivity in a short period of time.
For Thessaloniki, the consequences could be particularly visible. Ryanair claims that last winter it provided around 90 percent of international capacity to Thessaloniki, while the base closure means the loss of three aircraft, 500,000 seats and 10 routes at that airport alone. The routes to be discontinued from Thessaloniki include Thessaloniki-Berlin, Thessaloniki-Chania, Thessaloniki-Frankfurt-Hahn, Thessaloniki-Gothenburg, Thessaloniki-Heraklion, Thessaloniki-Niederrhein, Thessaloniki-Poznań, Thessaloniki-Stockholm, Thessaloniki-Venice Treviso and Thessaloniki-Zagreb. In addition, the Athens-Milan Malpensa and Chania-Paphos routes will also be discontinued.
For Zagreb, this means the loss of one winter international route to northern Greece, a market that is not large, but remains interesting due to tourism, business and regional links. Although this is not a route that would significantly change the traffic structure at Zagreb Airport on its own, its cancellation shows how sensitive seasonal and secondary routes are to broader airline decisions on capacity allocation.
Ryanair says it will redeploy the aircraft to Albania, regional Italy and Sweden, markets it describes as more favorable and competitive. From the airline’s perspective, this is a rational decision: an aircraft has to fly where it generates the best return. From the perspective of regions losing routes, however, such rationality looks considerably colder. Low-cost carriers bring traffic, passengers and tourism spending, but they rarely offer the certainty of long-term connectivity if the cost structure changes.
That is why the Thessaloniki case is also a reminder for other European airports. It is not enough to attract an airline and open a base; it is also necessary to maintain a model that remains commercially sustainable for that airline in the long term. At the same time, the way in which such pressure is communicated is not irrelevant. Ryanair has the right to protect its costs and allocate capacity where it sees better returns, but publicly labeling partners, highlighting ownership structures and calling on the government to intervene against airport operators raises the question of whether business pressure has crossed the line of constructive dialogue.
For passengers, the outcome is simpler and less pleasant: fewer routes, fewer seats and fewer choices during the winter months. For tourism regions, the message is even more serious. Revenue growth and strong demand are not enough if costs undermine profitability. In aviation, especially in the low-cost model, the battle is often not about where passengers want to travel, but where an aircraft can earn the most at the lowest cost.
